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CASE NOTES
EQUAL PROTECTION-CITIZENSHIP IS AN
IMPERMISSIBLE REQUIREMENT
FOR BAR ADMISSION
The United States Supreme Court recently extended alien rights
when it held that it was a denial of equal protection for a state to limit
the practice of law to United States citizens. The factual setting of the
Court's decision began when Fr6 Le Poole, a citizen of the Netherlands,
left her native land in 1965 to visit -the United States and decided to re-
main. Two years later she married John Griffiths, a United States citi-
zen, and moved to Connecticut where she attended Yale Law School. In
1969, Ms. Griffiths received her LL.B. and became a law clerk at the
New Haven Legal Aid Bureau. She applied for admission to the Con-
necticut bar, but her application was denied by the Committee on Recom-
mendations; she fulfilled all the qualifications to take the bar examina-
tions save one-United States citizenship.' Although eligible to become
a citizen by virtue of her marriage to an American citizen, 2 Ms. Griffiths
chose to remain a citizen of the Netherlands; she had neither filed nor
intended to file a declaration of intent to become a citizen of the United
States.3
Once her application was denied, Ms. Griffiths petitioned the Superior
Court for New Haven County, seeking a decree which would permit her
to take the Connecticut bar examinations and which would declare her
eligible for admission to the Connecticut bar. Her petition was denied
by both the superior court and, on appeal, the Connecticut Supreme
Court.4 The latter court found that the citizenship requirement was "not
simply reasonable but . . . basic to the maintenance of a viable system
of dispensing justice under our form of government." 5 The requirement
1. CONN. SUPER. CT. R. 8(1).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1970).
3. Id. § 1445(f). This fact is significant since several lower courts had ruled
for the alien on the basis of declared intention to become a citizen.
4. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A.2d 281 (1972).
5. Id. at 263, 294 A.2d at 287.
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was also said to 'be able -to withstand the stricter test of a "compelling state
interest," 6 i.e., that the "unique" status of members of the Connecticut
bar as "commissioners of the Superior Court" justifies the exclusion of
aliens from the legal profession. The petitioner's other arguments were
dismissed as well.8 On appeal, in a 7-2 decision delivered by Justice
Powell, the United States Supreme Court held the citizenship requirement
to be unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the laws to resi-
dent aliens and reversed and remanded the case. In re Grilfiths.9
The Grilfiths decision is a logical one in light of recent cases. 10 This
extension of protection of "discrete and insular minorities"' can and
should be viewed as a continuation of earlier developments in relation
to the alien in the United States. This Note will briefly trace the legisla-
tive and judicial history of the treatment of the alien in the United States
to explain why this decision is a logical and important extension of the
6. Id. at 262, 294 A.2d at 287. With regard to equal protection of the laws,
a suspect classification, such as alienage or race, is subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny. Only if a "compelling state interest" can be shown will the courts permit
the classification to stand. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376
(1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race). For
further discussion of the "compelling state interest" test, see Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1132 (1969).
7. "Each attorney at law admitted to practice within the state, while in good
standing, shall be a commissioner of the superior court and, in such capacity, may,
within the state, sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths.
.. CONN. GEN. STAT. 51-85 (1968).
8. Petitioner claimed that Rule 8(l) interfered with the exclusive federal
power over immigration. The court felt that the rule "[was] neither inconsistent
with nor repugnant to the power over immigration conferred on Congress. .. "
162 Conn. at 266, 294 A.2d at 289. Ms. Griffiths' claim that the rule violated
her first amendment right to determine her own nationality, a right recognized in
international law, was also dismissed. Id.
9. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist wrote
dissenting opinions, the latter criticizing the inclusion of alienage as a suspect
classification, the former criticizing the lack of consideration given to the particular
role of the lawyer. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting; also applies to In re Griffiths); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 730
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
10. See discussion in text accompanying notes 28-40 infra. Note that several
writers have expressed the view that the citizenship requirement for attorneys is un-
necessary. See, e.g., Fisher & Nathanson, Citizenship Requirements in Pro-fessional and Occupational Licensing in Illinois, 45 CHI. B. REC. 391, 397 (1964);
M. KONVITz, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 188 (1946) [here-
inafter cited as KoNvITz, THE ALIEN]; Ohira & Stevens, Alien Lawyers in the United
States and Japan-A Comparative Study, 39 WASH. L. REV. 412 (1964); Comment,
Aliens' Rights, the Public Interest, and the Practice of Foreign Law, 10 STAN. L.
REV. 777 (1958).
11. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
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protection accorded our resident aliens, and will comment on the areas
in which discrimination against the alien is still permitted.
In the early nineteenth century, aliens and citizens were accorded simi-
lar rights.1 2 However, as the century progressed with its increased indus-
trialization and immigration, -he treatment of the alien changed. Asians
were the first to experience this change, i.e., the exclusion of the
Chinese l3 and Japanese, and 'the ineligibility of the latter for citizenship. 14
Several reasons have been suggested for this change in treatment. These in-
clude: a larger number of immigrants; an increased competition for jobs,
especially in the western states which experienced the oriental influx; and
the end of an available "frontier" which previously had absorbed large
numbers of individuals. 15
Notwithstanding the movement toward more restrictive treatment of
aliens, the United States Supreme Court had early laid the basis for the
protection of aliens. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,'6 an 1886 case, the Court
held that the selective enforcement of a municipal ordinance (applied
only to Chinese laundries) was a denial of equal protection to aliens:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the pro-
tection of citizens .... These provisions are universal in their applica-
tion, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection
of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.' 7
Ten years later the Court stated that the fifth and sixth amendments also
were applicable to aliens.' Yet despite these holdings, numerous state
restrictions on aliens continued and the courts generally acquiesced.
These restrictions were widespread and varied. Aliens were excluded
from employment of public works projects' 9 and were refused licenses for
occupations which would affect the "public welfare."'20  The courts
usually viewed these limitations as a reasonable exercise of -the police
12. At least twenty-two states and territories permitted aliens to vote. See
KoNvrrz, THE ALEN, supra note 10, at 1.
13. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
14. Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (Japanese held in-
eligible for citizenship).
15. See KONVITZ, THE ALiEN, supra note 10, at 172; Rok v. Legg, 27 F. Supp.
243, 245 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
16. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
17. Id. at 369.
18. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
19. See, e.g., People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, affd, 239 U.S. 195
(1915).
20. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
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power.21  Exceptions to this treatment occurred when a treaty with the
alien's native land specified otherwise.22  Without such a treaty, a state
could deny aliens the right to own, lease or have any title to or inter-
est in land by exercising its police powers23 and could refuse them li-
censes for a variety of occupations.
Despite these restrictions, both the federal and state courts have grad-
ually recognized greater rights for aliens. The basis for this recognition
has rested primarily upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, rather than on the "supremacy" clause or the due process
clause. 24 The federal supremacy argument was accepted by the Supreme
Court in Truax v. Raich,25 a case dealing with an Arizona statute which
forbade the hiring of aliens for more than twenty percent of the work
force on any job. Although the statute was declared unconstitutional pri-
marily as a denial of equal protection, the Court used language indicative
of its concern with the clash between state and federal power:
The assertion of an authority to deny aliens the opportunity of earning
a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the State would be tantamount to
the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in the ordi-
nary cases they cannot live where they cannot work. And, if such policy
were permissible, the practical result would be that those lawfully admitted
to the country under . . . acts of Congress, instead of enjoying . . . the
21. See Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (pool and
billiards rooms); People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915), afj'd,
239 U.S. 195 (1915) (public works projects); George v. City of Portland, 114
Ore. 418, 235 P. 681 (1925) (soft-drink business); Wright v. May, 127 Minn.
150, 153, 149 N.W. 9 (1914) (auctioneer); Commonwealth v. Hana, 195 Mass.
262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907) (pedlar). But see Templar v. State Bd. of Examiners
of Barbers, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N.W. 1058 (1902) (denial of barber's license held
violative of the fourteenth amendment).
22. See, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 343 (1924). "While regulation
[of pawnbroking] has been found necessary in the public interest, the business is
not on that account to be excluded from the trade and commerce referred to in the
treaty." But see Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
23. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923). But see Sei Fujii v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). For a general discussion of three
theories often cited as justification for the denial of the right of aliens to work,
see Comment, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57
COLLM. L. REv. 1012 (1957).
24. Justice Murphy, in a concurring opinion, did state that
once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes in-
vested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within
our borders. Such rights include those protected by the First and Fifth
Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between citizens
and resident aliens.
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945).
25. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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privileges conferred by the admission, would be segregated in . . . States
[which] offer hospitality. 26
The same two reasons, denial of equal protection and federal su-
premacy, were given by the Court in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Com-
mission27 as the bases for its holding. California was prohibited from re-
fusing to grant Takahashi, an alien, a fishing license, and thereby barring
,him "from earning his living as a commercial fisherman in the ocean
waters off the coast of California. '28  Justice Black, writing for the major-
ity, stated that
[sitate laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or
residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with [the]
constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have
accordingly been held invalid.29
The Court further emphasized that the fourteenth amendment "em-
bod[ies] a general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall
abide 'in any state' on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens un-
der non-discriminatory laws. '"30
Takahashi would seem to have indicated that discrimination of aliens
would no longer be acceptable. Four years later, in Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy 3  a case dealing with the deportation of legally resident
aliens, the Court summed up the rights of aliens by stating that the Con-
stitution does assure the alien "a large measure of equal economic oppor-
tunity," the right to invoke the writ of habeas corpus, the "protections
of .the Fifth and Sixth Amendments" in criminal proceedings, and just
compensation for property taken.3 2  The Court held, however, that the
resident ;alien is not legally equal in all respects to the citizen and could
be subject to deportation under the Alien Register Act of 1940 for mem-
bership in the Communist Party. Justices Douglas and Black argued for
reversal on the grounds that the Act denied aliens both equal protection
and due process,83 but because of the federal interest in national security,
,the majority refused to hold Congress to the same strict standards as it
did the state and local legislatures.34
26. Id. at 42.
27. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
28. Id. at 412.
29. Id. at 419.
30. Id. at 420. For further analysis of Takahashi, see Note, 1947-48 Term of
the Supreme Court: The Alien's Right to Work, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 257 (1949).
31. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
32. Id. at 586 n.9.
33. Id. at 598.




This strict standard for evaluation of alien legislation was explicitly
called for in Graham v. Richardson35 when alienage was first declared
a suspect classification and "therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny
whether or not a fundamental right [was] impaired."' 6 State statutes
which denied welfare benefits to resident aliens or aliens who had not
resided in the United States for a specified number of years were declared
to violate equal protection of the laws. The Court also accepted federal
supremacy in the area of immigration as a valid argument against the
statutes.a7  State welfare statutes with restrictions on aliens "equate with
the assertion of a right, inconsistent with federal policy, to deny entrance
and abode. Since such laws encroach upon exclusive federal power [over
immigration], they are constitutionally impermissible."38
Some recent cases have accepted this additional argument of federal
supremacy in relation to the alien,39 but the majority of cases appears
to have emphasized the deprivation of equal protection of the laws. 40 In
re Griffiths follows this trend by holding that the State had not met its
burden of proving a compelling interest. States have a legitimate inter-
est in determining whether an applicant to the bar has the requisite char-
acter and professional competence for the practice of law. Connecticut,
and other states and territories with similar rules, went beyond a legiti-
mate interest in requiring applicants to be United States citizens or aliens
who had made an official declaration of intention to become a citizen.41
Griffiths makes it clear that any legally registered alien may practice a
profession as long as he or she has the necessary qualifications, regardless
of whether that person is or intends to become a citizen. The Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the "special" role of an attorney in Con-
35. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
36. Id. at 376. Note that since the right of interstate travel had already been
held to be a "fundamental right," the Court could have chosen to limit its holding
in Graham by basing it upon violation of that right. See generally Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAzv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
37. 403 U.S. at 378.
38. Id. at 380.
39. See Mohamed v. Parks, 352 F. Supp. 518, 521 (D. Mass. 1973); Teitscheid
v. Leopold, 342 F. Supp. 299 (D. Vt. 1971); Chia Chu George Hsien v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 79 Wash. 2d 515, 488 P.2d 515 (1971).
40. See, e.g., Lopez v. White Plains Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1016
(S.D. N.Y. 1973); Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496
P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972); Younus v. Shabat, 336 F. Supp. 1137
(N.D. Ill. 1971); Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court, 332 F. Supp. 1392
(D. Hawaii 1971); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. California, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d
645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
41. V MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1974).
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necticut as an "officer of the Court" justified a citizenship requirement.
"[We] observe -that the powers 'to sign writs and subpoenas, take recog-
nizances, [and] administer oaths' hardly involve matters of state policy
or acts of such unique responsibility as to entrust them only to citizens."'42
The State also attempted to justify the exclusion of aliens from the bar
as an extension of the general federal and state policy of barring aliens
from participating in the machinery of government. 43  This justification
was also rejected: "[T]he status of holding -a license to practice law
[does not] place one so close to the core of the political process as to
make him a formulator of government policy."'44 Therefore, Connecticut
Superior Court Rule 8(1), which excluded aliens from the Connecticut
bar, did not meet any compelling state interest and was declared uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause. 45
Griffiths makes it apparent that states cannot easily limit the rights of
aliens. Aliens take part in most areas of American life. They are sub-
ject to the laws of the United States, 46 are counted in determining con-
gressional representation, 47 are taxed, 48 may send their children to public
schools, 49 and may be conscripted into military service. 50, It is particu-
larly important for the courts to scrutinize any attempt to limit the rights
of aliens since the alien has often been discriminated against and is with-
out any political power, i.e., is excluded from voting and holding office.5
It should be noted that although the recent advances in alien rights
have generally been in the area of state-alien relations, problems still exist
for the resident alien in two other key areas: private and federal employ.-
42. 413 U.S. at 724. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger was unwilling to
accept this "denigration of the posture and role of a lawyer as an 'officer of the
court.'" id. at 730.
43. Brief for Appellee at 10-11, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1971). See
also KONvITz, THE ALIEN, supra note 10, at 1.
44. 413 U.S. at 729.
45. Id.
46. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
47. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 n.9 (1964).
48. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 645 (1973).
49. Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D. V.I. 1970). See also Chapman v.
Gerard, 456 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1972) which struck down a statute excluding aliens
from a public scholarship program.
50. Astrup v. Immigration Service, 402 U.S. 509 (1971); United States v.
Lamothe, 152 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1945); Military Selective Service Act of 1967,
50 U.S.C. §§ 453-54 (Supp. II, 1972).
51. KONvITZ, THE ALIEN, supra note 10, at 148-89.
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ment. Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 52 deals with discrimination
by a private employer. Mrs. Espinoza alleged -that Farah's refusal to hire
her on the basis of her Mexican citizenship was a violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court held that an em-
ployer's refusal to hire an alien may or may not be discrimination based
upon "national origin" because Title VII does not deal with "citizenship"
requirements. "Aliens are protected from illegal discrimination under the
Act, but nothing in the Act makes it -illegal to discriminate on -the basis
of citizenship or alienage."'53 It appears that until Congress legislates oth-
erwise, private individuals may freely discriminate against aliens in the area
of private employment as long as the employers are able to show that ali-
enage, and not a particular national origin, is the basis of the d'iscrinmina-
tion.5 4
The constitutional aspects of federal discrimination against the employ-
ment of aliens have been mentioned but not ruled upon by the Supreme
Court.5 5 Two recent district court decisions5" do not suggest that the sit-
uation is about to change for the alien. Both involved unsuccessful chal-
lenges of the federal denial of the opportunity for non-citizens to take the
competitive examination for federal civil service employment.
In Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton,"r the court held that the classsification
could have a rational basis and was therefore valid; in Jalil v. Hampton"8
the court remanded the case to determine whether the presidential order
52. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
53. Id. at 95.
54. Id. at 93. Because the vast majority of Farah's employees are Mexican-
Americans, Mrs. Espinoza could not argue that Farah was merely using the "form,"
alienage, to discriminate against individuals of a particular national origin.
However, it is important to note that Mrs. Espinoza failed to assert a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 claim and relied solely on Title VII. The Supreme Court has clearly indi-
cated that aliens are protected by the statute. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971). Recently, the fifth circuit held that § 1981 extends protection against pri-
vate employment discrimination to "all persons," alien or citizen. Guerra v. Man-
chester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. We need not address [the] question [of whether "statutes and regula-
tions discriminating against noncitizens in federal employment are uncon-
stitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment"], for
the issue presented in this case is not whether Congress has the power to
discriminate against aliens in federal employment, but rather, whether
Congress intended to prohibit such discrimination in private employment.
Id. at 91. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 n.12 (1973).
56. Jalil v. Hampton, 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887
(1972); Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
57. 333 F. Supp. 527, 532 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
58. 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
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authorizing the Federal Civil Service Commission to establish standards
exceeded the statutory authorization. Justice Bazelon wrote a strong dis-
sent, stating that a compelling "state" interest should be required to jus-
tify the discrimination:
It is ...inconceivable that the Government could establish a compelling
state interest ...to justify the exclusion of all aliens from all positions
requiring the competitive Civil Service examination.
The only interest which could possibly rise to that level is the perceived
necessity for employing persons of undivided loyalty in policy-making posi-
tions, or positions involving national security interests. But the weakness
of this interest as a justification for the total exclusion of aliens from com-
petitive positions becomes apparent upon examination of the entire text of
the Civil Service regulations [which] provide explicit exceptions for the
employment of aliens. 59
It does seem ironic that the federal government can discriminate in em-
ployment when a state may not. In Sugarman v. Dougall,60 a case
handed down at the same time as Griffiths, the Court held unconstitu-
tional § 53 of the New York Civil Service Law which restricted perma-
nent positions in the competitive class of the state civil service to United
States citizens. "[A] flat ban on the employment of aliens in positions
that have little, if any, relation -to a State's legitimate interest, cannot
withstand scrutiny under -the Fourteenth Amendment."' 61
The gains achieved for alien rights by the rulings in Takahashi,62
Truax,63 Graham,64 and Griffiths,6 5 key cases discussed above, have all
been based on state action and a denial of equal protection of law under
the fourteenth amendment. Given the difficulty of establishing state ac-
tion 6 coupled with the rulings of the recent federal cases, 67 it is apparent
59. 460 F.2d at 930-31.
60. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
61. Id. at 647.
62. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
63. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
64. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
65. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
66. In the past the Supreme Court has found state action in what would appear
to be completely private conduct, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), when
state action was found in court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants. How-
ever, the present Court has indicated that it will not be as "loose" in its requirements
for state action, i.e., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in which
no state action was found although the club, with a discriminatory guest policy, had
been granted a state liquor license.
67. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973); Jalil v. Hampton, 460
F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Mow Sun Wong v. Hamp.
ton, 333 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1971). But see note 34 supra.
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that the elimination of discrimination against aliens on the federal and pri-
vate levels would best -be accomplished by specific congressional legisla-
tion. If our basic national policy is to extend many constitutionally guar-
anteed rights to lawfully admitted aliens, and if the right to earn a living
is the essence of personal freedom and opportunity in our country,6 8 then
aliens should 'be free to hold employment without being subjected to dis-
crimination.
Roslyn Corenzwit Lieb
68. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
